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Fiction is under increased attack as authors test the creative, and
unwittingly the legal, limits of their craft, and persons who believe that
their reputations have been tarnished retaliate with defamation suits.'
Consequently, fictionists feel constrained, and publishing houses are
hesitant to publish fiction, particularly historical novels and works by
unknown writers.2 The cost of libel insurance, once a rare feature in
the literary world, has skyrocketed, and some publishers now procure
this insurance for their authors.3
Although all writers bewail their exposure to liability, fictionists
have a particular concern: Recent constitutional developments in def-
amation are difficult to apply to fiction, and protections inherent in the
common law occasionally go unnoticed. This constitutional infusion,
which provides defendants with more, not less, protection than at com-
mon law, curiously has led to increased vulnerability for fictionists. A
few courts apply Supreme Court mandates in a manner appropriate for
factual writings, not fiction, and, in concentrating upon first amend-
ment principles, they seem oblivious to the protections for fiction pres-
ent in the elements and defenses of defamation. These courts have
skewed the delicate balance between two important interests: free
speech and an individual's reputation.
1. See, e.g., Goodale, Stranger Than Fiction: The Novel That Gave Rise to Libel Dam-
ages, Nat'l L.J., May 5, 1980, at 26; Pilpel & Chasen, The Trouble With "Faction," Publish-
ers Weekly, July 18, 1980, at 20; see also Friendly, In Libel Suits, Juries Exact Damaging
Dues For Damaged Reputations, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1981, § 4, at 8, col. 3; Lauter, Libel
Suits: New Wave Is Predicted, Nat'l L.J., June 21, 1982, at 1 (potential plaintiffs less hesitant
to sue).
The concern for fictionists is not of recent origin. A nineteenth century advertise-
ment warned: "And indeed there is not in the world a greater error than which fools are apt
to fall into, and knaves with good reason to encourage than the mistaking a satirist for a
libeller." J. TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL, AND
ON THE REMEDY BY CIVIL ACTION FOR THOSE WRONGS 20 n.5 (1868). See also Fiction and
Libel, 161 LAW TIMES 161, 172 (1926) (proposed legislation to protect fictionists).
2. "[A]l first novels should be considered suspect. They tend to be autobiographical,
and twentieth century fiction is replete with examples of writers whose first novel, at least,
leaned heavily on the author's (usually unflattering) portrayal of and judgment on his fam-
ily." H. PILPEL & T. ZAVIN, RIGHTS AND WRITERS 23 (1960). See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 650 (2d Cir. 1966) (author's first novel portraying his brother).
The term "fictionist" includes all novelists, playwrights, short story writers, and
others who present a fictional, not factual, reality for their readers.
3. O'Connor, Authors Given Libel Coverage, Sunday Sun (Baltimore), April 4, 1982, at
K7, col. 1.
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Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 which created a constitu-
tional privilege to err honestly in statements of fact about public offi-
cials,5 and subsequent cases which extended first amendment
protection to criticism of public6 and private7 figures, a plaintiff must
prove both the falsity in the writing and the defendant's fault (or "ac-
tual malice" if the plaintiff is a public figure) in making the false state-
ment of fact. This focus on truth and falsehood and the margin of error
appropriate to protect society's interest in free speech - essential to
constitutional privilege analysis - initially appears misplaced in cases
involving fiction. The distinction between truth and falsehood is re-
duced to an absurdity if applied mechanically to fiction, "the conscious
antithesis of truth."8 An author who eschews any pretense of present-
ing a "true" account of actual events must struggle to apply a standard
that protects defendants who do not knowingly, recklessly, or, in some
cases, negligently make false statements of fact about another.9 Simi-
larly, the heated debate over the distinction between public and private
figures - and now "limited interest" public figures" - is bewildering
4. 376 U.S. 254, motion denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964). See infra text accompanying notes
78-87.
5. The Supreme Court held:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his offi-
cial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" - that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
376 U.S. at 279-80.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1966), the Court expanded the "public
official" concept to include persons at the lowest levels of government.
6. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). For a general discussion of
the present state of Maryland defamation law see Comment, The Maryland Court ofAppeals."
State Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 36 MD. L. REV. 622
(1977). See infra notes 58-59.
8. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 233 N.E.2d 840, 845, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832, 838 (1967) (Bergan, J., dissenting). Judge Bergan argued that: "All fiction is
false in the literal sense that it is imagined rather than actual. It is, of course, 'calculated'
because the author knows he is writing fiction and not fact; and it is more than a 'reckless'
disregard for truth." Id.
9. See Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1283-84
(D.N.J. 1981); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 870-71, 603 P.2d
454, 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 359 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 61, 89, 155 Cal. Rptr. 19, 45 (Files, P.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); Silver, Libel the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the
First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1094 (1978); see Comment, Privacy, Defamation,
and the First Amendment Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 926, 943-44
(1967).
10. See, e.g., Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981).
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to the fictionist, who finds it difficult to distinguish between a parody of
a "public figure" and a satire of society which focuses on an unknown
"private figure." Although many fictionists nevertheless have pre-
vailed," many recent cases have chilled fictionists who base their work
on real people or contemporary events. The harm from these cases,
two of which will be discussed at length, extends beyond any judgment
for damages: By ignoring or misunderstanding precedent, some courts
have blurred the borders of permissible writing.
This Comment describes how a reader's perception that a work
and its characters are fictitious arises and what effect this understand-
ing has upon the reader's reasonable belief whether a writing defames
the plaintiff. A novel that embarrasses or otherwise harms a plaintiff
nevertheless may be nondefamatory. As courts for centuries have rec-
ognized, some "fiction" deserves protection, but other writings pub-
lished under the guise of fiction do not. The results of this experience
are built into the elements and defenses of common-law libel, slander,
and the related privacy causes of action. '2 In particular, a writing must
be "of and concerning," or sufficiently identify, the plaintiff as the sub-
ject of the writing. If, however, the plaintiff satisfies this threshold hur-
dle, the writing may fail to make a false representation of fact. After
New York Times, some courts have melded the latter requirement into
a constitutional protection for opinion.
This study of defamation 3 by fiction is divided into three sections:
The first analyzes the "of and concerning" element, and focuses upon
11. See, e.g., Lyons v. New American Library, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536
(1980) (fictionist prevails, but rationale unclear); Shapiro v. Newsday, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (same); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 439-40
(10th Cir. 1982) (judgment for defendant, but scant analysis of the "of and concerning"
requirement), petitionfor cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1983) (No. 82-162 1);
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 19 (defendants liable in poorly
reasoned opinion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980).
12. This Comment focuses on libel, but the analysis also applies to slander and related
torts such as "false light" invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
which are subject to the same first amendment restrictions. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982),petitionfor cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S.
Apr. 12, 1983) (No. 82-1621); Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 766
(D.N.J. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment f(1977); see Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489, 491
(1975); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205,
1207 (1976).
13. "[N]o definition of the term 'libel' [, or defamation, is] sufficiently comprehensive to
embrace all cases .. " Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 437, 146 A.2d 880, 883 (1958).
See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §111 (4th ed. 1971); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 39-42 (1980). The elements vary dramatically from case to case, de-
pending on at least four factors: the plaintiff, the defendant, the character of the allegedly
1983]
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group defamation analysis, which is particularly valuable in studying
fiction. This identification requirement is crucial in fiction cases be-
cause, unlike a writing that purports to be factual, a work of fiction
might be unable to portray any real person. The next section discusses
how the fictionist creates the impression that the writing is fiction, not
fact, and how this perception affects the "of and concerning" element,
the false representation of fact requirement, and the reader's under-
standing of the writing as a vehicle for expression of opinion. This
section ends with an analysis of the "archetypal character" concept,
which is both a useful literary device and a valuable legal approach to
evaluating fiction. The third section reviews two recent cases in which
fictionists and their publishers suffered judgments at trial, Bindrim v.
Mitchell14 and Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,'5 to highlight the
difficulties in applying defamation law to fiction.
I. A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY:
THE "OF AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT
A. Accommodating Fiction
Although the requirement that a writing be of and concerning the
plaintiff is assessed easily in cases involving a writing that purports to
be factual, such as a newspaper, this element presents a difficult chal-
lenge for a plaintiff who feels maligned by an unsavory character in a
novel or a story. The dual nature of the "of and concerning" require-
ment - first, that the writing portray an ascertainable person, and sec-
ond, that the plaintiff be this person 6 - provides the key to
understanding the protection it affords fiction: In factual writing, the
reader may be unable to discover which person the writing portrays,
but, in fiction, the writing might not portray any real person. Literary
characters, as the standard frontispiece disclaimer admonishes, may be
"fictitious, and any resemblance to any actual person, living or dead,
defamatory writing, and the jurisdiction whose law applies. R. SACK, supra, at 39. Section
558 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests four requirements:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another,
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
14. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 1040 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 172-94.
15. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982),petition for cert.fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. Apr. 12,
1983) (No. 82-1621). See infra text accompanying notes 195-214.
16. See infra note 21.
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purely coincidental." Thus, satisfying the "of and concerning" require-
ment in fiction involves more than adding up identifying indicia, such
as names and physical characteristics. Despite similarities between the
plaintiff and the literary cognate, the reasonable reader may conclude
that the work of fiction does not identify the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding this protection, a few courts ignore the demands
of the "of and concerning" element and thus force an interpretation
that the writing is about an actual person. These courts incorrectly rely
upon superficial similarities or fiction's roots in real events. 17 The iden-
tification requirement, however, demands a portrayal: The writing
must do more than suggest to the reader that an actual person served as
the basis for the fiction. Courts should not fail to examine properly
whether the writing identifies the plaintiff: If a writing is not of and
concerning the plaintiff, it cannot be defamatory.' 8 When a court per-
mits a jury to disregard the resonable perception that the fiction fails to
portray the plaintiff, liability follows easily: A novel that is not of and
concerning a plaintiff certainly will contain false statements of fact
about that person.
B. The "Of and Concerning" Requirement
The basic components of the "of and concerning" element are
straightforward, but are often difficult to apply to fiction. Generally,
the plaintiff must prove' 9 to the trier of fact20 that the reasonable reader
would perceive the writing as intended to portray an ascertainable per-
son and that the plaintiff is that person.2 The level of recognition must
17. See infra text accompanying notes 172-214 (analysis of two such cases, Bindrim V.
Mitchell and Piing Y. Penthouse Intl Lid).
18. See, e.g., LaVey v. Smith, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1363, 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1982). "If
a court concludes that the allegedly libelous material is not of and concerning the plaintiff, it
is not necessary to reach other grounds for dismissal." Id.
19. E.g., Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (burden of proof on
plaintiff to show identification); Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 17,
155 N.Y.S.2d 1,.16, 137 N.E.2d 1, 11-12 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564
comment f (1977).
20. The trier of fact decides whether a writing is of and concerning the plaintiff. E.g.,
Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1980); Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson,
103 Md. 671, 683, 64 A. 36, 40 (1906); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617 (1977).
One court considered summary judgment on this issue inappropriate: "[T]he issue is
generally left for resolution by the trier of fact. . . [because] the plaintiff is entitled to de-
velop and present a full evidentiary record." Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d at 640. Other
courts have not been so reticent about granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Wheeler v.
Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) (summary judgment for defendant); Lyons
v. New American Library, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1980) (same).
21. Eg., National Shutter Bar Co. v. G.F.S. Zimmerman & Co., 110 Md. 313, 318, 73 A.
19, 21 (1909); Bonham v. Dotson, 216 Ky. 660, 662, 288 S.W. 297, 298 (1926).
The Second Restatement misstates the "of and concerning" requirement. According
19831
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rise to a portrayal of the suspect character as the plaintiff-a standard
that rarely is met in fiction. The issue is neither whether the writing is
based upon or otherwise loosely connected with the plaintiff, nor,
under common law, whether the defendant actually intended to repre-
sent the plaintiff. The gravaman of the tort of defamation - and an
essential point in understanding the "of and concerning" requirement
- is that the writing misrepresented the plaintiff's character22 by yield-
ing to the reader a perceived intent to portray the plaintiff.23
The writing is the focus of identification analysis: It alone can in-
jure the plaintiff's legally protected interest in his reputation. Before
the infusion of constitutional law into the field of defamation, the writ-
ing was a dangerous instrumentality for which there was strict liabil-
ity.24 Neither the author's actual intent or level of care,25 nor the
to the Restatement, "[a] defamatory communication is made concerning the person to whom
its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to
refer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977). Inasmuch as the passage implies
that the reader must either (1) reasonably, albeit mistakenly, understand that the defendant
intended to refer to the plaintiff or (2) have correctly, but not reasonably guessed that the
defendant intended to refer to the plaintiff, it is contrary to the case law, see infra text ac-
companying notes 56-66. The first statement was correct before New York Times and Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); the second has never been correct.
22. "Perhaps the most comprehensive term in which the libel concept can be expressed
is that of misrepresentation of the victim's personality." L. GREEN, W. MALONE, W. PE-
DRICK & J. RAHL, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 373 (1959) (emphasis in original). See also W.
PROSSER, supra note 13, at 737; 1 F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 47-48
(1981).
23. See Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951) ("reason-
ably be understood as a portrayal of the plaintiff"); Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d
650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966); Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir.
1969); Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 n. I (S.D. Ohio 1975),
aff'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976); Baldwin v. Hildreth, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 221, 221 (1859)
(Shaw, C.J.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 comment d (1977); Smith, Jones v.
Hulton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views As to a Question of Defamation (pt. 2), 60 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 461, 480 (1912).
Some commentators have missed this crucial point. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 9, at
1084-86 (arguing for this standard because "what makes good literary sense should have
some legal relevance," but failing to recognize support in the case law).
24. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 368-69.
25. Eg., Duvivier v. French, 104 F. 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1900); Switzer v. Anthony, 71
Colo. 291, 294, 206 P. 391, 392 (1922); Granger v. Time, Inc., 174 Mont. 42, 49, 568 P.2d 535,
540 (1977); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920); Jones
v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, 456 (C.A.), afl'd, 1910 A.C. 20; 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 13, § 5.7, at 369; R. SACK, supra note 13, at 112. Contra Clare v. Farrell,
70 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Minn. 1947) (relying on dictum in two turn-of-the-century cases
and a criminal libel statute which expressly required intention); Hanson v. Globe Newspa-
per Co., 159 Mass. 293, 295, 34 N.E. 462, 463 (1893) (Holmes wrote the dissenting opinion);
Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 184, 116 P. 530, 548 (1911) (actual intent relevant "where the
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plaintiff's belief that he had been defamed 26 was relevant. The only
relevant intent was the "perceived intent" which a reader could discern
from the writing. It did not even matter whether the defendant was
aware of the plaintiff's existence.27 Moreover, a writer could not af-
firmatively defend a suit by proving to whom the writing referred. 28
Now, however, as will be discussed in the next section, the defendant is
no longer strictly liable for the accidental identification of another.
Thus, actual intent is irrelevant in the first instance to whether a writing
is of and concerning the defendant, but is relevant to show that the
defendant acted without the requisite negligence or "actual malice. 29
Despite this limitation on evidence of the defendant's intent, a
plaintiff may introduce extrinsic facts to explain how readers might un-
derstand indicia, such as nicknames, addresses, and physical character-
istics,3" as identifying a particular person. For example, the plaintiff
can demonstrate how references such as "city magistrate of. . . Jeffer-
son Market Court"31 or "Sheriff in Malone '3 2 influence a reader.
Under common law, the extrinsic facts necessary to identify the plain-
tiff were known as the "colloquium," which the plaintiff had to plead if
he was not expressly named in the writing.33
Proof that the defendant based the suspect character on the plain-
tiff cannot satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement: Basis-in-fact is
reference to plaintiff is so veiled, obscure, and ambiguous that the jury cannot see and say,
without extrinsic evidence, that the plaintiff was aimed at and was injured").
A few cases suggested that the defendant must be at least negligent in identifying the
plaintiff. Eg., Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346, 351, 352, 53 A. 237, 238, 239
(1902); see Smith, Liabilityfor Negligent Language, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 198-99 (1900)
(discussing circumstances under which negligence might be relevant to an identification
issue).
26. Eg., Robinson v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 297 F. Supp. 722, 726 (D. Me. 1969);
Granger v. Time, Inc., 174 Mont. 42, 49, 568 P.2d 535, 540 (1977); see also Helmicks v.
Stevlingson, 212 Wis. 614, 616, 250 N.W. 402, 403 (1933) (defendant's admission to plaintiff
irrelevant).
27. Eg., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920);
Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 55 App. D.C. 162, 163, 3 F.2d 207, 208 (1925).
Two or more persons could be defamed by the same writing although it applied on
its face to a single person. See, e.g., Constitution Publishing Co. v. Way, 94 Ga. 120, 123, 21
S.E. 139, 140 (1894); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 369-70.
28. See, e.g., Memphis Commercial Appeal, Inc. v. Johnson, 96 F.2d 672, 674 (6th Cir.
1938); Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 55 App. D.C. 162, 163, 3 F.2d 207, 207 (1925).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 56-66.
30. Eg., Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 682, 64 A. 36, 40 (1906).
31. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 62-63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920).
32. Lyons v. New American Library, Inc., 78 A.D. 2d 723, 724, 432 N.Y.2d 536, 537
(1980).
33. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md. 140, 153-54 (1872); Velle Transcendental Re-
search Ass'n, Inc. v. Esquire, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 799, 802-04, 354 N.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1976);
R. SACK, supra note 13, at 112-24.
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irrelevant. a4 Nevertheless, similarities between the plaintiff and the
character may be relevant insofar as they are known by the writing's
readers. 35 For example, evidence that the defendant based a character
on a childhood friend cannot enable a jury to identify the character as
the plaintiff,36 but extrinsic facts, such as a nickname common to both,
may show why some readers reasonably believed the two to be the
same person.
To be actionable a defamatory writing must be "published" to a
third person who understands that the writing portrayed the plaintiff.37
The understanding of the readership, be it the public-at-large or a well-
defined group, determines the writing's meaning.3 Thus, the entire
world need not believe that the writing identifies the plaintiff;39 a single
reader who knows the plaintiff and has read the writing is sufficient. If,
however, extrinsic facts are necessary to identify the plaintiff, the
reader must know these facts.4°
The understanding of the reader to whom the writing was pub-
lished must be reasonable. 41 A witness' belief 42 that a writing identifies
34. Eg., Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1969);
Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962); Wright v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Mass. 1944); see Helmicks v. Stevlingson, 212 Wis.
614, 616, 250 N.W. 402, 403 (1933) (defendant's admission to plaintiff irrelevant).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
36. See Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969).
37. Eg., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 648, 261 A.2d 731, 734-
35 (1970); Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 539, 251 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1979). A defendant
generally is not liable if the plaintiff "publishes" the writing. See, e.g., McKinney v. County
of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1980). By analogy, a
plaintiff should not be able to provide his witnesses with the extrinsic facts necessary to
render the writing defamatory.
38. See, e.g., Werber v. Klopfer, 260 Md. 486, 491-92, 272 A.2d 631, 634 (1971) (alleg-
edly defamatory lampoon of leftist professor distributed only to plaintiff and six alumni).
39. E.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951);
Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 977 (D. Minn. 1978); Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 564 comment b (1977).
40. Duvivier v. French, 104 F. 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1900); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 564 comment b (1977).
41. E.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980); Washington Post Co. v.
Kennedy, 55 App. D.C. 162, 163, 3 F.2d 207, 208 (1925) ("ordinary sensible readers, know-
ing the plaintiff").
A few courts and commentators would exact a higher standard. See, e.g., Wright v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Mass. 1944) (requiring that "a consid-
erable and respectable class in the communities where the defendant's picture was shown
identify [the characters] as [the] plaintiffs"); Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for
Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U. L. Rav. 571, 593 (1981) ("average literary
sophistication"); see Hill, supra note 12, at 1310 n.474.
42. A witness' opinion whether a writing is of and concerning the plaintiff is admissible.
E.g., Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 682, 64 A. 36, 40 (1906); Mid-
dlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 412 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir. 1969).
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the plaintiff is not conclusive: His understanding cannot overcome a
reasonable reading by the trier of fact.43 When a writing is read as a
whole,' shared physical traits, mannerisms, and other identifying indi-
cia may not sufficiently portray a particular person. For example, the
reader's perception that similarities between the plaintiff and the sus-
pect character are coincidental cannot support a reasonable belief that
the writing is of and concerning the plaintiff.45 The mere use of a
person's name usually cannot support a finding that the writing identi-
fied him.' For example, if the writing defames "John Smith," the jury
must determine that the writing identified "John Smith," the plaintiff.47
If, however, the plaintiffs name is unique or pervasively known in the
community, reference to it might satisfy the "of and concerning"
requirement.48
Although a jury must limit its inquiry to the writing and not ex-
plore the defendant's actual intent, it need not honor an author's efforts
to disguise his characters in an attempt to avoid liability.49
"[P]seudonyms and other artful dodges"50 do not negate a reasonable
understanding that the writing is of and concerning the plaintiff.5" For
example, the suspect character need not have a name. 2 The existence
43. Eg., LaVey v. Smith, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1363, 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1982). "An
assertion in a single affidavit from one reader is insufficient to establish the 'of and concern-
ing' requirement in light of a plain reading of the publication." Id.
44. An allegedly defamatory writing must be examined in context. Eg., Smith v. Hunt-
ington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 n.l (S.D. Ohio 1975), aff'drem., 535 F.2d
1255 (6th Cir. 1976); see Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 214 Ga. 422, 423, 105 S.E.2d 229,
230 (1958) (defamatory headline must be construed with article).
45. Eg., Summerlin v. Washington Star Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2460, 2462
(D.D.C. 1981); Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1975), affdmein,
535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976).
46. Eg., Summerlin v. Washington Star Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2460, 2462
(D.D.C. 1981) ("plaintiff can point to nothing except a bare coincidence of first and last
names"); Allen v. Gordon, 86 A.D.2d 514, 515, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (plaintiff, the only "psy-
chiatrist in Manhattan named Dr. Allen," not identified by novel), aft'd, 56 N.Y.2d 780, 452
N.Y.S.2d 25 (1982). But see Gasperini v. Manhinelli, 196 Misc. 547, 549, 92 N.Y.S.2d 575,
577 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (jury question whether deletion of "Jr." identified plaintiff, rather than
his son, in medical report describing son's nervous disorder).
47. Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watt. 392, 394 (Pa. 1835) (Gibson, C.J.) ("John Smith, . . . the
appellative of thousands"). But see Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444 (C.A.), aft'd,
1910 A.C. 20 ("Artemus Jones" sufficient despite numerous dissimilarities).
48. See, e.g., Harrison v. Smith, 20 L.T.R. 713 (1869) ("General Plantagenet Harrison,"
a well-known military figure in the nineteenth century).
49. E.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901,905 (8th Cir. 1951); Kelly v.
Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D. Mass. 1948).
50. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 475 (4th ed. 1971).
51. E.g., King v. Clerk, 94 Eng. Rep. 207, 207 (1728). See infra note 53.
52. Eg., Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 279 So.
2d 32 (Fla. 1973); Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460,464,
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of details inapplicable to the plaintiff does not forestall liability. 3 An
accumulation of "artful dodges," however, may compel a reasonable
understanding that a writing does not identify the plaintiff. 4
The components of the "of and concerning" element demand a
high level of recognition and have led some courts to impose a "rule of
certainty."" The writing must portray the plaintiff, not merely "refer
to" or "be about" him. It must do more than evoke some connection
between the plaintiff and the suspect character. If the reasonable
reader does not interpret the allegedly defamatory writing as represent-
ing the plaintiff, the writing is not actionable.
C. The Constitutional Intrusion
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the many cases in the past two
decades that have expanded upon it, such as Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. ,6 have altered greatly the law of defamation, including the "of
and concerning" element. These cases radically transformed the bal-
174 N.E. 602, 604, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (1961). The use of the plaintiff's name, however,
may be required for some state privacy actions, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (Mc-
Kinney 1976); see, e.g., Levey v. Warner Bros., 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (playwright's
estranged wife, the basis for a character, not named).
53. E.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1966); Ellis v. Brock-
ton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 541, 84 N.E. 1018, 1019 (1908); Clark v. North American
Co., 203 Pa. 346, 351, 53 A. 237, 238-39 (1902) (different first name).
One judge reasoned that if "clumsy inventions" excused defendants from judgments,
"[tihe consequence would be, that the land would be filled with violence and blood." Hays
v. Brierly, 4 Watts 392, 395 (Pa. 1835) (Gibson, C.J.).
54. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (charac-
ter of plaintiff so radically altered by defendant that the literary cognate no longer repre-
sented the plaintiff).
55. E.g., Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publishing Co., Inc., 218 F.2d 612, 621
(9th Cir. 1954) (must be "certainty as to the person defamed"); Helmicks v. Stevlingson, 212
Wis. 614, 615, 250 N.W. 402, 402 (1933); see Yankwich, Certainty in the Law of Defamation,
I U.C.L.A. L. REV. 168, 170-81 (1953); see also Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d
650, 653 (2d Cir. 1960) (this burden "is not a light one").
This "rule" has led a few courts to require that, absent the name of the plaintiff, the
reasonable reader have "no doubt ... as to the person's identity." Summerlin v. Washing-
ton Star Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2460, 2461 (D.D.C. 1981) (emphasis in original); ac-
cord Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1331 (W.D. Wisc. 1977) (applying D.C.
law), afl'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Har-
mon v. Liss, 116 A.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Mun. App. 1955). This requirement is distinct, how-
ever, from the standard of proof required of plaintiffs. Although no court has discussed
what standard is appropriate in light of New York Times and its successors, these cases
apparently compel a "clear and convincing," rather than a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. See R. SACK, supra note 13, at 124; Anderson, Libel and Press Seif-Censorship, 53
TEx. L. REV. 422, 462-65 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86; Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 342; Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
56. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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ance that the common law of libel and slander had struck between an
individual's right to an unblemished reputation and society's interest in
free speech. After New York Times, the balance favored freedom of
expression over an individual's reputation." The imposition of a mar-
gin of error inherent in the actual malice requirement effected this shift.
Although some plaintiffs must prove "actual malice," no defendant (at
least one in the media58) is liable today without fault.59 To buttress
these protections for speech, New York Times imposed two require-
ments: a "clear and convincing" standard of proof' and an independ-
ent examination of the facts upon review.6 '
After Gertz, the defendant's actual intent to portray the plaintiff
still does not support a reasonable understanding that the writing is of
and concerning the plaintiff,62 but a defendant is no longer strictly lia-
ble for an accidential reference to a real person.63 For example, if a
57. See generally Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.) (discussing effect of
Times), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Ingber, Defamation. A Conflict Between Reason and
Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979) (same). The Supreme Court recently noted an individ-
ual's interest in his reputation as a basic concern, but reaffirmed the basic principles of New
York Times. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155-57 (1979). Professors Harper and
James, among others, supported the strict liability aspect of the "of and concerning" element
before New York Times. They excused occasional harsh results, such as Jones v. E Hulton &
Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 444 (C.A.), a§'d, 1910 A.C. 20, in which the defendant was liable solely
for using the plaintiff's name, arguing that:
[t]he test is entirely independent of the state of mind of the defendant, and if persons
knowing the plaintiff might reasonably suppose it referred to him, the defendant is lia-
ble. In view of the princiules ofsocialpolicy involved and the argument and analysis by
the eminent judges in Jones v. E Hulton & Co., it is submitted that the decision of the
House of Lords in that case is socially desirable and legally convenient and sound.
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 369 (emphasis added). Jones is no longer good
law even in England. See Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 4.
58. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 113 n.16 (1979) (Burger, C.J.) (dictum) (sug-
gesting that Gertz does not apply to noamedia defendants); Note, Mediaocracy And Mistrust."
Extending New York Times Defamation Protection To Nonmedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1876 (1982) (arguing for protection); see also Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580,
350 A.2d 688 (197.6) (applying Gertz to nonmedia defendant as a matter of state law).
59. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). In Gertz, the Court held
that "so long as [state courts] do not impose liability without fault, [they] may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual." 1d. at 347.
60. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ("the convincing clarity which
the constitutional standard demands"); see Note, Maryland's Summary Judgment Procedure
in New York Times Defamation Cases - Berkey v. Delia, 40 MD. L. REV. 638, 647-48
(1981) (discussing the "clear and convincing" standard of proof).
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)); Werber v. Klopfer, 260 Md. 486, 490-91, 272 A.2d 631, 634
(1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A comment g (1977).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
63. Eg., Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Polakoff v. Harcourt,
Brace, Javanonich, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2516, 2517 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 67
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defendant intends to describe one person, another by the same name
will not be successful against the writer if he was not at fault in failing
to forsee this confusion.64
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt expressly with the level
of fault permissible in the identification requirement, it has consistently
rejected strict liability as the basis for liability in defamation actions.
Thus, an argument that New York Times and Gertz apply only to a
defendant's knowledge, recklessness, or negligence with respect to the
falsity of statements of fact,65 is inconsistent with the principles under-
lying these two cases.66
The defendant now has the best of both worlds: His actual inten-
tion to refer to the plaintiff is not actionable unless the writing is under-
stood reasonably as portraying the plaintiff, but an absence of fault in
realizing that the reasonable reader would identify the plaintiff bars
liability as a matter of consitutional law. This intrusion of constitu-
tional principles in defamation law narrows the range of potential
liability.
D. Group Defamation: An Alternative Approach
1. Background - An alternative approach to any discussion of
the "of and concerning" element - and a valuable one for fictionists
- is whether one who defames a group or class defames individual
members of that group. The methodology is distinct from standard
identification analysis, but a court applying group defamation theory is
asking the same underlying question: Is the writing of and concerning
the plaintiff? Approaching "of and concerning" issues in fiction by
group defamation analysis provides insights into how fictionists write,
and contributes to a proper application of identification principles to
fiction.67
Generally, the plaintiff must show either that the limited size of
the group induces a belief that all members are defamed, or that he is
A.D.2d 871, 413 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1978); R. SACK, supra note 13, at 124; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 580A comment d, § 580B comment b and c (1977); Anderson, supra note
55, at 462-63.
64. Eg., Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (magazine article about
unethical attorney named "Ryder" shown to describe the intended target, not the plaintiff).
Compare Ryder with Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 55 App. D.C. 162, 3 F.2d 207 (1925)
(newspaper liable under remarkably similar facts).
65. See R. SACK, supra note 13, at 109.
66. See id. at 124; Anderson, supra note 55, at 462. New York Times and subsequent
cases "bespoke the Court's concern with the necessity to protect speakers and writers for all
innocent misstatement; to free them from absolute liability for statements innocently made
that prove to be false and defamatory". R. SACK, supra note 13, at 124.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
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specifically identified. 68 If the group is too large, no cause of action will
lie without further indicia.69 Although a majority of courts formerly
held that qualifications such as "most" or "some" forestalled individual
identification,1° most courts now recognize that a charge against a
group may cast suspicion upon all members and therefore may identify
each one.7 ' This relaxation of group defamation principles, however,
has not been matched by any slackening in other identification
standards.
A court can characterize any identification question as a group
defamation problem.72 For example, "Mrs. J.C. Johnson of Savan-
nah"73 can denote a group (married women named "Johnson" in towns
68. E.g., Robinson v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 297 F. Supp. 722, 726 (D. Me. 1969);
Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Kaufman, J.); see 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 367; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A
(1977); R. SACK, supra note 13, at 116-19; see generally Lewis, The Individual Member's
Right to Recoverfor a Defamation Leveled at the Group, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 519 (1963).
69. E.g., Robinson v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 297 F. Supp. 722, 726 (D. Me. 1969);
Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Some commentators
have suggested that defamation of a group over 25 is not actionable. See, e.g., R. SACK,
supra note 13, at 117; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A comment b (1977). But
see Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla.) (members of 70-man football
team identified), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 513 (1962); Service Parking Corp. v. Washington
Times Co., 67 App. D.C. 351,353,92 F.2d 502, 504 (1951) (recovery denied to group of 10 or
12).
70. E.g., Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc. 330 Ill. App. 295, 297-98, 71 N.E.2d 553,
554-55 (1947); Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 471-72, 277 N.W. 177, 178-79 (1938).
71. Eg., Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Gross v.
Cantor, 270 N.Y. 93, 96, 200 N.E. 592, 593 (1936); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 564A comment c (1977) (requiring "a high degree of suspicion"). But see Loeb v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Mass. 1980) (requiring "special application" or
"particular reference").
72. Viewing an "of and concerning" issue as a group defamation problem may not only
be clearer conceptually, but in the 1940's through the early 1960's it also met a preceived
need to provide a weapon to private parties to combat racism and bigotry. See, e.g., Belton,
The Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative Study of Law and its Limitations, 34 TUL.
L. REV. 299 (1960); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation" Control of Group Libel, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942). Before New York Times, the Supreme Court appeared recep-
tive to this use of group defamation theory. Compare Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 350
(5-4), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952), with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
A student commentator recently advocated the use of group defamation to combat
statements that are prejudicial and likely to incite anger, but failed to realize the effect of
New York Times and its progeny. See Note, Group Vilication Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J.
308 (1979) (using William Shockley and the Skokie, Illinois Nazis as examples). The author
would impose criminal sanctions on persons who make false statements of fact about a
group if the statements threaten serious harm to some substantial public interest and "by-
pass. . . the conscious faculties of its hearers." Id.passim.
73. Memphis Commercial Appeal, Inc. v. Johnson, 96 F.2d 672, 673 (6th Cir. 1938)
(defamatory statement true of "Mrs. J.C. Johnson of Savannah, Georgia," but false about
"Mrs. J.C. Johnson of Savannah, Tennessee").
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called "Savannah") as does the statement "Neiman[-Marcus] models
are call girls."74 If a plaintiff alleges that a television advertisement
defaming "Mario's Restaurant" is of and concerning him, the court can
conclude either that the plaintiff is insufficiently identified or that the
group of "Mario's Restaurants" is too large.75
2. The Other Side of New York Times and Rosenblatt - New
York Times and Rosenblatt v. Baer,76 decided two years later, contain
significant implications for courts facing an "of and concerning" prob-
lem: Group defamation theory cannot provide an easy avenue to iden-
tifying the plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff belongs to a group that
contains public officials and public figures. These cases counter the
trend at common law allowing easy identification of members of de-
famed groups." This development is particularly important to fiction-
ists because every literary character can be viewed as a member of a
"group" of like literary figures or real people. For example, the reason-
able reader may question whether a novel containing the stereotypical
cop-on-the-beat or sultry night club singer specifically identifies a par-
ticular policeman (a public official) or famous singer (a public figure).
Although neither New York Times nor Rosenblatt is remembered
well for its discussion of the "of and concerning" requirement, both
cases could have been resolved on this issue alone.78 They held that
impersonal criticism of a group containing public officials, such as a
governmental body, constitutionally cannot lead to identification of the
group's leaders and members without a clear reference to them as indi-
viduals. Subsequent cases have extended the constitutional protections
for criticism of government to criticism of public figures.7 9 Persons in
the public eye bear the risk that they will suffer the unpleasantness of
criticism of groups to which they belong.
New York Times' "actual malice" rule originated in the fear that
74. Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
75. Mario's Enterprises, Inc. v. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1308,
1312-13 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (plaintiff not identified in television ad which featured an ill cus-
tomer of "Mario's," of which at least 391 restaurants exist nationwide); see also Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Sanders, 563 S.W.2d 8,9 (1978) (per curiam) (Colo-
nel Sanders' derogatory remarks concerning his former restaurant chain did not identify any
particular franchise).
76. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
78. Before the opinion in Times, one commentator claimed: "Freedom of Speech,
clearly, is not the issue [in New York Times]." Comment, Group Defamation in the U.S.A.,
13 CLEV. MAR. L. REv. 7, 31 (1964).
79. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See infra note 99 and
accompanying text.
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"of and concerning" analysis of a breed countenanced by the Alabama
Supreme Court would permit civil actions for seditious libel. The
Supreme Court of Alabama had held that alleged misstatements in an
advertisement describing the Montgomery police department's harass-
ment of blacks reasonably imported a charge of improper conduct to
the plaintiff, a member of the city Board of Commissioners.80 By find-
ing that the ad "especially" related to the commissioner because the
defamed group was his responsibility,8' the state court created a form
of "vicarious" defamation unknown under common law. 2
The Supreme Court of the United States, in addition to pronounc-
ing the now famous "New York Times rule,"8 3 held that the evidence
was "constitutionally defective [because] it was incapable of supporting
the jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of
and concerning' [Sullivan]. ' 84 As required in other first amendment
contexts,8 5 the Court made an independent review of the facts and state
law, and expressly refuted the Alabama court's logic that converted
defamation of a group into defamation of its leader.8 6
80. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 675, 144 So. 2d 25, 38-39 (1962).
Sullivan, as Commissioner for Public Affairs, indirectly supervised 175 full-time policemen
and twenty-four "special traffic directors", but did not oversee day-to-day operations. Brief
for Petitioners at 10, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reprinted in 58
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 413 (P. Kurland & G. Casper, ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as New
York Times Brief].
81. The Alabama court reasoned that
it is common knowledge that the average person knows that municipal agents, such as
police and firemen, and others, are under the control and direction of the city governing
body, and more particularly under the direction and control of a single commissioner.
In measuring performance or deficiencies of such groups, praise or criticism is usually
attached to the official in complete control of the body.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. at 674-75, 144 So. 2d at 39.
82. See Comment, Group Defamation in the US.A., supra note 78, at 9 ("Prior to this
controversial case [the plaintiff] clearly had no grounds for protection."); New York Times
Brief, supra note 80, at 463-64 (Brief for Petitioner). Contra Kalven, The New York Times
Case.- A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191,
197. Kalven argued, "It is important to stress that the Alabama decision was not simply a
sham." Id. Professor Kalven, however, offered no support for his conclusion.
The state court's reliance on DeHoyes v. Thornton, 259 A.D. 1, 18 N.Y.S.2d 121
(1940), the only case cited for this novel argument, was misplaced. The plaintiffs in
DeHoyes were the mayor and trustees of a small village who were identified by the phrase:
"officials ... [who] run our village." Id. at 2, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 122. The result in DeHoyes,
however, may have been different under Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). See infra
text accompanying notes 88-100.
83. See supra note 5.
84. 376 U.S. at 288.
85. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (independent exami-
nation of the whole record of black protesters' breach of peace convictions).
86. 376 U.S. at 291.
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Justice Brennan, who authored New York Times, further reasoned
that the Alabama theory was merely- a device to avoid the constitu-
tional bar to seditious libel actions
by transmitting criticism of government, however impersonal it
may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence potential
libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed. There
is not legal alchemy by which a State may thus create [such a]
cause of action. . . . [Tihe proposition relied on by the Alabama
courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression.87
Thus, the Court rejected Alabama's identification analysis not only on
a common law level, but also because it unconstitutionally restricted
criticism of government.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,8" the Supreme Court again focused upon
impersonal criticism of government, and strengthened the restrictions
on group defamation analysis. Justice Brennan equated criticism of a
small group of public officials with criticism of government, thereby
denying the natural defamatory import of the defendant's remarks. Ro-
senblatt took the New York Times' bar against civil "seditious libel"
actions, and extended it to preclude identification of individual mem-
bers of public groups unless they were "specifically identified" by the
writing.
The plaintiff in Rosenblatt, a former supervisor of a county-owned
ski resort, sued a newspaper for an article critical of the fiscal manage-
ment of the recreation area. 9 The trial judge's instruction that "an
imputation of impropriety or a crime to one or some of a small group
that casts suspicion upon all is actionable"9 was consistent with the
trend at common law. The verdict for the plaintiff did not appear un-
reasonable: The defamed group contained only four members.9' The
Supreme Court, however, held that "in the absence of sufficient evi-
87. Id. at 292. Earlier in the opinion Brennan had emphasized the value of governmen-
tal criticism. See id. at 268-76. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 567-91 (free speech checks abuses of official
power).
88. 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (Brennan, J.). The Court in the two intervening years had heard
only Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (New York Times applicable to criminal
libel) and Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam) (actual ill-will does not consti-
tute "actual malice"). Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), a
case involving federal labor policy, but applying New York Times principles, was handed
down the same day as Rosenblatt.
89. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 78-79.
90. Id. at 98.
91. See Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N.H. 26, 203 A.2d 773 (1965). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 68-71.
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dence that the attack focused on the plaintiff, an otherwise impersonal
attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to establish a li-
bel of those administrating the operation." 92 The article could not be
"read as specfical/y directed at the plaintiff, ' 93 notwithstanding the
small size of the defamed group.
Rosenblatt reasonably can be interpreted as spelling the end of
traditional group libel analysis when public officials are members of
the group. 94 Regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public official, if
other members of the group are public officials, he must be specifically
identified 9" and prove "actual malice." 96 Courts following Rosenblatt
have required "statements [to be] reasonably susceptible of a definite
application to a particular individual"97 if the group contains either
public officials98 or public figures, or is itself a public figure. 99 Unfortu-
nately, however, some courts have forgotten Rosenblatt, and have held
defendants liable for impersonal criticism of governmental and other
public groups, such as police departments. '°°
92. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 80. Justice Harlan dissented on the "of and concern-
ing" issue because he was satisfied that "conventional tort law" adequately protected public
officials. Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
94. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 196 (1966).
95. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 83;accord Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517, 526, 251
N.Y.S.2d 823, 831 (1964), aj7'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29
(1965).
96. 383 U.S. at 84-86.
97. Scelfo v. Rutgers University, 116 N.J. Super. 403, 408, 282 A.2d 445, 448 (1971)
(emphasis in original). In Scelfo, the two plaintiffs failed to show that they were identified
by a defamatory student newspaper article about six police officers who quelled an antiwar
rally. Id. at 407-408, 282 A.2d at 447-48.
98. Eg., Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (writing inappli-
cable to particular DEA agents because "the statements must reasonably relate to a certain
member or members"); accord Mullins v. Brando, 13 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417-19, 422-23, 91
Cal. Rptr. 796, 801-03, 805 (1970) (police officers), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971);
Wainman v. Bowler, 176 Mont. 91, 95, 576 P.2d 268, 270 (1978) (police chief). But see
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 227, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787-88 (1981)
(police officers). In Brady, individual members of group of 53 officers were identified by the
statement: "It is inconceivable to us that so much misconduct could have taken place with-
out the guilty knowledge of the unindicted members of the department." Id. See supra note
69. Compare Brady with Scelfo v. Rutgers University, 116 N.J. Super. 403, 282 A.2d 445
(1971) (article about six police officers not specifically identifying the two plaintiffs).
99. E.g., Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D.V.I. 1979) (lawyer in Black Panther
trial); see also Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Mass. 1980).
The Rosenblatt standard also has been applied in cases involving "public interest"
- a concept of questionable validity in the Supreme Court's present defamation schema.
See e.g., Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 978 (D. Minn.
1978), aftd, 602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979) In Schuster, the court reasoned: "To hold that
statements commenting generally on the laetrile controversy are of and concerning individu-
als prominent in the controversy would chill heated public debate into lukewarm pap." Id.
100. See, e.g., Cushman v. Day, 43 Or. App. 123, 129-30, 602 P.2d 327, 330-32 (1979)
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The Supreme Court in New York Times and Rosenblatt severely
restricted the use of group defamation analysis (and therefore also stan-
dard "of and concerning" principles) to identify public officials, public
figures, and those associated with them. These cases reverse the relaxa-
tion of group identification principles, and protect criticism of public
matters. The effect is readily apparent in fiction: When a fictionist
selects the characters for his work, he chooses them from "groups."
(An easy example is the satirist who assails stereotypical figures, such
as the greedy banker and the unwelcome mother-in-law.) When the
suspect character belongs to a "public" group such as a class of well-
known feminists or prominent musicians, individual members of these
groups may not be defamed by statements such as "the leaders of
NOW are communists" or "all 'Grammy' winners in the past two years
bribed their way to the top."
II. FICTION, NOr FACT
A. Fiction.- A4 Calculated Falsehood'l
"Fiction" is a conclusory label which attaches to a writing that
fails to command the belief that it represents real persons and real
events. A reader who perceives a writing (or part of it) as fiction may
be unwilling to conclude that it is of and concerning the plaintiff, or
makes any false statements of fact. Thus, the legal challenge to the
fictionist is to gauge when "reality itself has been destroyed and re-
placed with fictions."' 0 2
(recognizing the concerns of New York Times, but failing to follow the stringent requirments
of Rosenblatt); Cushman v. Edgar, 44 Or. App. 297, 302-03, 605 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1980)
(same); see also Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 236-37, 445 N.Y.S.2d
786, 793-94 (1981) (applying Rosenblatt incorrectly).
Only one commentator has discussed the "of and concerning" aspect of this much-
analyzed case. See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 94, at 196. The Note merely
observed that "the use of traditional 'group libel' theory is inappropriate" and that "it does
seem clear that the Court will have more to say on the question." Id. The Court has not
spoken since then on this point.
101. "Calculated falsehoods," in the sense that they are intentional misstatements of fact
designed to be understood as true, are not protected by the first amendment. Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1965). Fiction, however, is a "calculated falsehood" of another
breed. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
Two particularly helpful cases in the field of fiction are: Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616
F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskil, J.), and Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d
141 (4th Cir. 1969) (Haynsworth, C.J.). Unfortunately, the most thorough judicial analysis
of defamation by fiction is not in an American case. See Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, 30
BVerfGE 173 (W. Ger.) (discussing artistic freedom, the identification requirement, fiction
as opinion, and the New York Times "actual malice" rule).
102. See R. SCHOLES, FABULATION AND METAFICTION 209 (1979). In a successful work
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The perception that a writing is fiction is the creation of the
fictionist: it is his art. Fanciful characters and events, the standard dis-
claimers that all characters are fictitious, and even the purchase of the
book off of a shelf marked "Fiction" can compel an expectation that
the reader will not encounter real persons and events." 3 Although
these factors do not preclude liability, the jury cannot unreasonably
disregard their effect upon the reader.
A reader's instinctive reaction that fiction cannot be defamatory
unfortunately cannot be translated into a blanket protection for all
writings that fall within a category labeled "fiction." Although some
courts have focused on the reader's perception of a writing as a whole
as fiction,"° a conclusory approach is unwieldy and fails to recognize
how a perception that an entire writing, or passage, is fiction affects
each component of the tort of defamation. Every court and most com-
mentators that have encountered an absolute protection argument have
rejected it.' °5 Instead, they have adhered to the Supreme Court's bal-
ancing approach which examines the effect of individual words and
abstains from gross characterizations. 06 Some commentators, how-
ever, persist in urging an absolute protection standard for "fiction" to
"[w]riter and reader [together] withdraw from the world to the printed tale." T. GOODMAN,
THE TECHNIQUES OF FICTION 17 (1955); accord S. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT
AND ACTION 115-17 (1972); R. SCHOLES, supra, at 3-8.
103. Eg., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); Middlebrooks v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969).
104. See University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22
A.D.2d 452, 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (movie ending in a football game in which Notre
Dame looses to "Fawz U." because of a pregame meal of spiced mongoose and an oil gusher
which floods the field), aft'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965). The Notre Dame court
asked, "Is there any basis for any inference on the part of rational readers or viewers that the
antics engaging their attention are anything more than fiction?" Id.
105. See, e.g., Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280,
1282 (D.N.J. 1981) (parody and satire); Embrey v. Holly, 48 Md. App. 571, 581-82, 429 A.2d
251, 259-60 (1981) (humor), ail'd, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92
Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (fiction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), reh'g
denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 97 Misc. 2d 346,
350, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (parody); Hill, supra note 12, at 1309 (fiction); see
also Dailey v. Bobbs-Merill Co., 136 N.Y.S. 570, 571 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (appearance as fiction
may be deceitful).
106. See, e.g, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in Times
rejected the absolutist approach proposed by Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) ("an absolute im-
munity for criticism of the way public officials do their duty"); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("an unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct").
A writing may identify some characters and not others. For example, a fictionalized
account of an event may portray some persons and at the same time distort the personalities
of others so that the "of and concerning" requirement is not met. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell
Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1962) (study of a murder).
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relieve "the courts of the impossible task of applying the elements of
defamation to fiction . "10o7
Although a bright-line test protecting fiction has enormous initial
appeal, the prospect of freedom from suits and judgments is idealistic.
A categorical approach would not remove complications, but would
create new ones. A comprehensive definition would have to encompass
the inherent protections now recognized in the elements and defenses
of defamation, and recognize plaintiffs' legally protected interests in
their reputations. A conclusory standard would neither establish clear,
protective boundaries, nor obviate the need for future adjudication. 08
Trial courts would be tempted to bend the definition to their perception
of the equities in each case. In addition, courts would have to distin-
guish constantly between "fiction" and "fact.'
The historical novel or "faction" accutely illustrates the difficulties
inherent in distinguishing between fiction and fact, and presents signifi-
cant challenges to the fictionist's lawyer. 0 The impact of fictional re-
portage as fact is its allure to some writers, and the cause of its legal
vulnerability. For example, Truman Capote's design in writing In Cold
107. Comment, supra note 41, at 592. Accord Stam, Defamation in Fiction.- The Case For
Absolute First Amendment Protection, 20 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 77,
passim (1981); Wilson, 44:4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 38-39 (1981); Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment IsAn Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 262-63; see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 401-02 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing for absolute protection from pri-
vacy actions for fictionalized treatments of public events); see also Franklin & Trager, Liter-
ature and Libel, 4 COMM/ENT 205, 218-21 (1982) (arguing for this standard, but realizing its
incompatibility with first amendment case law).
Fiction, of course, is a mode of expression that is protected by the first amendment.
Meiklejohn, supra, at 262-63; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960); Comment,
supra note 9, at 943-45; Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6, 19-20 (10th Cir.
1952) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
108. See Easterbrook, Ways Of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 810 n.22
(1982) (generally discussing balancing tests and bright-line rules).
109. One absolutist admits that "the development of a comprehensive definition of fiction
has troubled literary scholars and philosophers for centuries .... " Comment, supra note
41, at 592. Her attempt at a definition fails: A fictionist who must judge "whether the writ-
ten piece purports to be factual, with the goal of informing, as opposed to fictional, with the
goal of enlightening or commenting upon some aspect of the human experience . . . [as
judged by] a reasonable person of average literary sophistication .... id., at 592-93, is not
relieved of his concern whether his writing is defamatory.
In addition, the distinction between informing and enlightening or commenting is
constitutionally impermissible when determining the breadth of first amendment protection:
"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
(the] basic right [of freedom of the press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding state law prohibiting sale of "magazine thrill-
ers" containing tales of criminal deeds unconstitutional).
110. See generally Silver, supra note 9, passim (essay discussing application of existing
law to the "new literature"); Philpel & Chasen, supra note l,pasim (faction).
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Blood, one of the best known works in this field, was "to produce a
journalistic novel, . . . that would have the credibility of fact, the im-
mediacy of film, the depth and freedom of prose, and the precision of
poetry."". This credibility may be dangerous: Authors who give their
readers fiction as fact do so at their peril.'1 2 A work may so effectively
portray a fictional reality that a reader reasonably may mistake the
writing for a factual representation of real persons and real events. In
addition, the fictionist's success in depicting "fact" may leave him un-
able, as a practical matter, to assert successfully that he accidentally
portrayed the plaintiff.
An author who attempts to mask his portrayal of a real person
should remember an oft-quoted maxim: "Reputations may not be tra-
duced with impunity, whether under the literary forms of a work of
fiction, or in jest . . . ,,.1 Fanciful events, disclaimers, and other
techniques do not guarantee immunity from liability." 4 To assess a
fictionist's vulnerability to suit each allegedly defamatory passage
should be studied not only in context, but also individually. Similarly,
each element and defense of defamation may preclude or contribute to
the conclusion that the writing is defamatory.
111. T. CAPOTE, MusIc FOR CHAMELEONS XiV (1980).
112. See, e.g, Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 A.D. 636, 640, 300 N.Y.S. 680, 684 (1937) (fictional
article in a news magazine), affd mert, 278 N.Y. 635, 16 N.E. 2d 297, reargument denied,
278 N.Y. 718, 17 N.E.2d 138 (1938); Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444 (C.A.) (in a
newspaper), af'd, 1910 A.C. 20; Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50
T.L.R. 581, 583 (C.A. 1934) (fictionalized account of Russian Revolution portraying plain-
tiff); see also "Missing'-makers ued, The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 11, 1983, at D2, col. 1 (suit by
U.S. ambassador in Chile for alleged portrayal in movie).
113. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920). See also
Donoghue v. Hayes, [1831] Ir. Ex. 265, 266 ("If a man in jest conveys a serious imputation,
he jests at his peril.").
114. The standard frontispiece disclaimer: "All of the characters in this book are ficti-
tious, and any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental," e.g., J.
BARTH, THE SOT-WEED FACTOR ii (1969), does not accord complete protection because
"[t]he disingenuous legend ... [may] not have been treated by the average person ... as
any more than a tongue-in-the-cheek disclaimer [under the circumstances]." Kelly v.
Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D. Mass. 1948).
Quaere what protection the following disclaimer commands: "Much of this book is
true, but much is fictional, and for that reason, the names of the family members and other
names have been changed, and the book should be considered a work of fiction." L. KESS-
NER, THE Spy NEXT DOOR iv (1981) (fictionalized account of a father-son spy team). A
mere change in name does not insulate a writing from liability. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 49-51.
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B. Literary Characters in Search of Plaintiffs."5 The "Of and
Concerning" Element Applied to Fiction
The "of and concerning" element is crucial to the analysis of any
writing that portrays a fictional reality."l 6 Although rarely a contested
issue in cases involving writings that purport to be factual, this require-
ment provides valuable protection to the fictionist. As one fictionist
claims, an author's characters may be "galley slaves" with no identity
except on paper. 17 To satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the reasonable reader has overcome the
fictionist's representation of his work as fiction and perceived the writ-
ing to represent real persons involved in real events.
Readers and viewers usually perceive characters in novels, movies,
plays, and other fictional works as not portraying real persons.ll 8 If a
reader considers a writing as a whole to be "fiction," his perception of
the fictionist's characters will be different than if the writing purported
to be factual." 9 Consequently, as a practical matter,
[m]uch stronger proof [is] required to satisfy a jury that readers
could reasonably understand a living person to be described in a
novel, than to satisfy them that such an interpretation could rea-
sonably be given to a newspaper article purporting to describe re-
cent occurrences at a specified place and date. In a play or novel
there is, practically speaking, a prima facie presumption that the
115. In Luigi Pirandello's play, Six Characters in Search of An Author, six stage
characters search for their identity. Unable to obtain an answer from their pool of
experience - the writing - they beleaguer a director to help them finish the play in which
an author has abandoned them. The final line of Six Characters is particularly apt to a
discussion of the "of and concerning" requirement: "No! I am the one for which you take
me." Similarly, the reasonable reader cannot explore beyond the writing and search for the
author's "true" intent. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
116. Other authors recently have noted the protections inherent in the "of and concern-
ing" element. See Franklin & Trager, supra note 107, at 208-12; Comment, Fiction Based on
Fact: Writer's Liability for Libel or Invasion of Privacy, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1040-
42 (1981), Comment, "Hey, That's Mel" - The Conundrum of Identification in Libel and
Fiction, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 442, passim (1982).
117. V. NABOKOV, STRONG OPINIONS 11 (1973).
118. E.g., Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969); Lan-
dau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 360, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), aft'd, I A.D.2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 564 comment d (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 comment j (Tent. Draft
No. 12, 1966).
119. Eg., Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 comment j (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966); see Nebb v.
Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (comic strip entitled "The Nebbs").
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characters are fictitious .... 120
Thus, the reader might not identify a literary character as an actual
person despite indicia that would compel identification if the writing
purported to be factual. 2 '
Although the realization that all fiction is based to some extent on
real persons, places, and events 22 may affect a reader's perception that
the writing portrays an ascertainable person, a finding that the fictionist
indeed based a character on the plaintiff cannot satisfy the identifica-
tion requirement.I23 Neither is a fictionist liable for the mere use of the
plaintiff's name or otherwise presenting his characters so that some
readers perceive a coincidental or superificial parallel between the
plaintiff and a literary character.124 The reasonable reader realizes that
a fictionist cannot create a character completely devoid of any similari-
120. Smith, supra note 23, at 476. See Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.
1980).
Professor Alfred Hill has proposed a qualified privilege that would preclude "liabil-
ity. . . unless the attributes of the fictitious [character] are basically different in kind from
those of the real and identifiable [plaintiff]." Hill, supra note 12, at 1309. This privilege
would accord only partial protection, and actually yields less protection than now available,
see, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962). In addition,
satirists and others with strong opinions would be liable despite a reader's perception of the
writing as opinion, not representation of fact. See infra text accompanying notes 137-71.
121. Compare Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (author not liable
for fictionalized account of Leopold and Loeb murder trial), with Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 212 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967) (author liable for fictional-
ized biography of baseball player), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1968).
122. See H. Pilpel & T. Zavin, supra note 2, at 22-23; N. HALE, THE REALITIES OF Fic-
TION 178-97 (1963); J. HELLER, GOOD AS GOLD 87 (1979); Boren, "Dear Constance," "Dear
Henry" The Woolson/James Affair- Fact, Fiction, or Fine Art?, 27 AMERIKASTUDIEN 457,
passim (1982); Henderson, The searchfor "Julia Was Hellman 's anti-Nazi hero really Muriel
Gardiner?, The Sun (Baltimore), May 3, 1983, at BI, col. 1. See supra note 2.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. The discovery of the "acorn of fact" that
is "the progenitor of the oak" cannot override a reasonable interpretation that the writing
criticizes the literary "oak," but not the "acorn." People v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 205
Misc. 818, 821, 130 N.Y.2d 514, 517 (Mag. Ct. 1954) (the movie "From Here to Eternity"
based on defendant's wartime compatriots); see Waters v. Moore, 70 Misc. 2d 372, 375-76,
334 N.Y.S.2d 428, 433 (Sup. Ct. 1972) ("The French Connection"); Wojtowicz v. Delacourt
Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) ("Dog Day Afternoon").
Saul Bellow in Herzog based the character of Valentine Gersbach, the lover of
Moses Herzog's wife, on a fellow professor at Bard College who had run off with Bellow's
wife. Ellenberg, Saul Bellow Picks Another Fight, Rolling Stone, March 4, 1982, at 14, 16.
According to Ellenberg, "Bellow said, 'I'll fix him. I'm going to stick him in my new novel.
By the time I'm through with him he'll be laughed right out of the literature business.
or words along that line," but the author later changed the character. Id.
124. Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1969) (nick-
name, town, and numerous other shared characteristics insufficient); Wheeler v. Dell Pub-
lishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (same name and other similarities insufficient);
Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 360-61, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254,
.257-58 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (name of plaintiffs company on fictional gangster's door not of and
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ties to real persons. 25 Thus, the fictionist need not search to see if ac-
tual persons exist with names or other characteristics identical to his
characters.'26 If fictionists had this duty, they would have
to scan thousands of telephone directories and business indices, to
comb voting lists and a myriad listings of names, individual, trade
and corporate. With our population stemming from every na-
tional origin, bearing names of infinite variety, even to anagram-
matize a name like Jones or spell it backwards would be little
protection, for somewhere in this wondrous land there must be
someone named Senoj.' 27
Although the "of and concerning" requirement does not require
statements of fact, the assertion of "facts" about the suspect character
contributes to a reasonable conclusion that the writing portrays some
person. For example, the reasonable reader will be more hesitant to
identify a character in a science fiction novel as the plaintiff, than one
in a work of "faction." The lack of any "facts" about a literary charac-
ter has a dual effect: The writing may not identify a real person, or
contain the constitutionally required false statements of fact (which will
be discussed later) because there is no ascertainable person with whom
the truth or falsity of the statements can be judged.
The reader's first-hand knowledge about the plaintiff and the writ-
ing's defamatory nature may dissuade him from believing that the writ-
ing portrays the plaintiff. The correct standard is whether the
reasonable reader, knowing the plaintiff, would identify the literary
character as the fictionist's attempt to represent the plaintiff.12 A per-
son who denies having any of his counterpart's "unsavory characteris-
tics" unwittingly may negate a perception that the writing describes
him.1 29 A curious paradox arises: the less tarnished a person's reputa-
concerning plaintiff), aft'd, 1 A.D. 2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1955). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 49-52.
125. Whether the names of an author's characters were "conjured out of thin air" or
"stolen" from an actual person, most names have a basis-in-fact: they denote some actual
person. See Real TJ Hooker sues over name, The Sun (Baltimore), April 9, 1982, at A3, col.
1 (wildlife artist suing for use of "his" name in television series).
126. E.g., Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1947); see Lake Havasu Estate,
Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (factual account).
127. Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 360-61, 128 N.Y.S.2d
254, 258 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (Frank, J.).
128. E.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962); Lahr v.
Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 55
App. D.C. 162, 163, 3 F.2d 207, 208 (1925). In Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1980, the court stated that "the reasonable reader must rationally suspect that the protago-
nist is in fact the plaintiff, notwithstanding the author's and publisher's assurances that the
work is fictional." Id at 639.
129. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962). Al-
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tion is in his community, the more difficult it will be for those who
know him well to identify a literary character as that person. 3° A
reader cannot mechanically disregard all defamatory characteristics
and indentify the character based solely on the remaining nondefama-
tory characteristics. All attributes which the fictionist gives his charac-
ters are part of the identification calculus.
Similarly, the apparent portrayal of a pervasively known person
by the use of the person's name and other identifying characteristics
that together usually would satisfy the "of and concerning" element
may be insufficient in fiction. The reader may know, or have readily
available to him, information that precludes identification. As will be
discussed later,' 3 ' by placing an "archetypal character" paralleled after
a well-known person (such as Richard Nixon or Frank Sinatra) in a
fictional world, the fictionist may be invoking the public persona of this
person who has achieved an almost mythological status, not portraying
him factually. For example, the use of "Richard Nixon" in a political
satire of the Fifties might not identify the real person. 32
A valuable approach to "of and concerning" questions involving
fiction is group defamation analysis. 133 Fictionists often select names
and other "group denominators" that evoke desired reactions from
their readers: The Irish cop-on-the-beat, the domineering stage
mother, and the spy in the trench coat are all familiar archetypal char-
acters. Even the use of more mundane stereotypes, such as "grand-
mothers" and "stewardesses," cause the reader to envision
grandmothers and stewardesses he has met or seen portrayed. The
technique is so common - and unavoidable - that the reasonable
though the locale and some of the fictional characters in Dell's Anatomy of a Murder were
comparable to the true participants, the court reasoned that "none who knew [the plaintiff]
could reasonably identify her with Janice Quill, 'that . . . noisy foul-mouthed harridan
.... .. . [T]hose who knew she was [the person upon whom the character was based]
could not reasonably identify her with Janice Quill, for [the plaintiff] denies having any of
the unsavory characteristics' of Janice Quill." Id.
130. See, e.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (1980). The court noted "the dis-
turbing irony inherent in the scheme: the more virtuous the victim of the libel, the less likely
it will be that she will be able to establish this essential confusion in the mind of the third
party." Id.
This is analogous to the use of "a first-person narrator [who] is not... identified
with the real-life author. Indeed, the ironic distance created between author and persona
can be one of the most telling effects of any fiction." Silver, supra note 9, at 1086 (emphasis
in original).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
132. See R. COOVER, THE PUBLIC BURNING (1977) ("Richard Nixon" seduces Ethel Ro-
senberg and is sodimized by "Uncle Sam"); see also Silver, supra note 9, atpassim (discuss-
ing The Public Burning).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 67-100.
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reader is reluctant to rely on the use of these archetypal characteristics
to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement. For example, "Sheriff
in Malone" might not identify the sheriff in that town because a reader
who believes the novel to be fiction may consider the reference to this
sheriff to be an arbitrary choice from the groups of "law enforcement
officials" and "towns" in the locale in which the story is set. 13 4 Group
denominators that are necessary to a subject matter are particularly un-
reliable: Movies about Hollywood need "actors;" novels about war
need "generals." A book about a prostitute, however, does not need to
make her a "stewardess."'' 35 In addition, the stringent requirements of
New York Times and Rosenblatt hinder reliance on characteristics that
place literary figures in groups of public officials and public figures.
136
C. Fiction as Ridicule or Opinion
Fiction unquestionably can hurt the feelings of a person whom
readers assume to be the target of the fictionist's barbs and derisive
comments, but nevertheless may fail to injure any legally protected in-
terest. Under common law, a writing may be nondefamatory if its
readers understand it to be merely a comment, or perhaps a joke, which
was not taken literally. This notion that the writing must affect the
recipient's perception of the plaintiff has been transformed in recent
years into a constitutional requirement that a writing yield a false state-
ment of fact, whether express or implied. Fiction, as the antithesis of
fact, may be incapable of stating any facts, true or false, about a person
whom the writing identifies. Thus, fiction may deserve protection
either as a nondefamatory comment, as a vehicle for expression of
opinion, or as "rhetorical hyperbole," an apparent admixture of the
common-law and constitutional strands of protection.
1. Background - Although "the whole sting and injury of the
libel [may be] in the comment,"' 137 the tort of defamation protects only
against damage to one's reputation and is not intended to compensate
for the infliction of emotional distress absent a misrepresentation of the
134. See Lyons v. New American Library, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1980)
(fictionalized account of "Son of Sam" murders depicting an incompetent "Sheriff in
Malone").
135. Cf. Springer v. Viking Press, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2040 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(former girl friend of defendant portrayed as a prostitute).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 76-100.
137. Cooper v. Lawson, 112 Eng. Rep. 1020, 1023 (K.B. 1838). See also Hill, supra note
12, at 1238-39.
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plaintiff's character.'38 Although some courts prior to New York Times
and Gertz had held defendants liable merely for effective invective,
lampoon, parody, and ridicule, 39 "dishonest" expressions of opinion,
and "unfair" comment,40 many courts required some statement or im-
putation concerning the plaintiff's character.'
4 1
138. E.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 5-6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1242-43 (1982);
W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 111, at 737.
139. Eg., Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.);
Pignatelli v. New York Tribune, Inc., 117 Misc. 466, 469, 192 N.Y.S. 605, 607 (Sup. Ct.
1921) ("Ridicule in and of itself, if it has harmful results, is sufficient."); Triggs v. Sun Print-
ing & Publishing Assn., 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904). For an effective discrediting of
Triggs and other cases in this line see Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1636-40 (1977). Burton is discussed infra at note
140.
In many opinions that contain strong language about ridicule, the defendant had
made a false statement of fact. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Hyde, 266 Or. 236, 512 P.2d 1003
(1973); Kirman v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 99 A.D. 367, 91 N.Y.S. 193 (1904).
140. Eg., Buckstaff v. Viall, 84 Wis. 129, 135, 54 N.W. 111, 113 (1893). In Buckstaff, a
sarcastic lampoon of state senator containing "gibes, taunts, and contemptuous and insulting
phrases" were not "reasonable comments upon his personal or official derelictions of duty."
Id.
The concepts of "honest" opinion and "fair" comment arose from the common-law
privilege of "fair comment" which generally allowed criticism of public officials if the com-
ment was "honest" and was not made with spite, ill will, or hatred. See generally I F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, § 5.28, at 456-63.
New York Times' constitutional privilege is an adaptation of the minority view of
fair comment that held defendants not liable for false statements of fact made negligently.
Recently, one commentator urged a return to "fair comment" in cases where the court re-
jects the New York Times privilege. See Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected
Fair Comment Defense.- An Alternative to "Actual Malice," 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1980).
The advice is well taken because the two privileges are not identical (e.g., in some states the
"public interest" concept is accepted, but with New York Times it is not) and may provide
additional protection to defendants.
141. See, e.g., Smith v. Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384,388,73 N.W.2d 429,431 (1955) ("noth-
ing in the picture itself whichfalsely tends to bring plaintiff into public disgrace or ridicule")
(emphasis in original); Carr v. Hood, 1 Comp. 355, 357-58, 170 Eng. Rep. 983, 984-85 (K.B.
1808) (ridicule is damnum absque injuria without "an attack on the moral character of [the]
plaintiff"); Donoghue v. Hayes, [18311 Ir. Ex. 265, 266 ("If a man in jest conveys a serious
imputation, he jests at his peril.") (emphasis added); Brown v. Harrington, 208 Mass. 600,
602, 95 N.E. 655, 655 (1911).
Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.), is per-
haps the best known case holding a defendant liable solely for ridicule in the absence of any
false statement of fact. The defendant published a photograph of the plaintiff, with his
permission, that showed him dressed in his riding habit and holding a saddle. The ribald
result was "patently an optical illusion, and carries its correction on its face as much as
though it were a verbal utterance which expressly declared that it was false": the plaintiff's
genitals appeared to be exposed and "grotesque, monstrous, and obscene." Id. at 154-55.
Although Learned Hand held that ridicule in itself was actionable and that a libel need not
comment on one's "moral character," id. at 155-56, he did strive to show that the plaintiff's
reputation was thus permanently affected. Id. The plaintiff would be known as the type of
person who posed for such photographs.
An excellent example of the incompatibility between Burton and the present struc-
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Recently, in the light of Supreme Court cases in defamation law,
most courts have realized that subjective evaluations of the legitimacy
of a defendant's opinions are constitutionally impermissible. I42  In
Gertz, a case that substantially completed the edifice begun by New
York Times, the Supreme Court noted: "Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of the
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."' 143 Although
this proposition was dictum, most courts and commentators have rec-
ognized that an expression of opinion qua opinion is entitled to abso-
lute constitutional protection.'" An "opinion" from which a reader
can infer defamatory statements of fact, however, deserves no
protection. 145
An argument that the first amendment does not protect opinion
would be incongruous with the present structure of defamation law.
An opinion qua opinion can be neither true nor false, and "actual mal-
ture of defamation is State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. 751, 360 A.2d 909 (1976). This
bizarre opinion refused to dismiss a criminal libel action for an obscene caricature of a
presidential candidate that was not a "statement, inference, or opinion of facts," but none-
theless remanded the case to the trial court to find "falsity." Id. at 758, 360 A.2d at 912. See
also Birnbaum, Libel by Lens, 52 A.B.A.J. 837, 839 (1966) (pre-Gertz article noting that the
New York Times standards would "present challenging problems" to Burton); Christie,
supra note 139, at 1623-25 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567A, at 46
(Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), which was based on Burton and was rejected after Gertz).
142. Eg., Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2607, 2612
(Okla.) ("Hatchet man" held to be "an epithet [that] is not libelous because it is not a state-
ment of fact, but rather a judgmental statement in which the maker of the same expresses his
views."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 5-6,
649 P.2d 1239, 1242-43 (1982); see Note, supra note 60, at 653 ("[A] defendant in a defama-
tion case cannot be held liable for exaggerations, half-truths, and rhetorical hyperbole.").
Compare Dal v. Time, Inc., 252 A.D. 636, 639, 300 N.Y.S. 680, 683 (1937) (defendant liable
for rendering plaintiff "contemptible and ridiculous"), afdmem., 278 N.Y. 635, 16 N.E.2d
297 (1938), with Scheinblum v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 37 Misc. 2d 1015,
1017, 239 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (Sup. Ct.) (not liable for a remarkably similar fact situation),
aff'dmena, 18 A.D.2d 841, 239 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1962).
143. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (Powell, J.) (citing Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugral Ad-
dress). Jefferson argued that "error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to
combat it." Id. at 340 n. 8.
144. Eg., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) ("however unreasona-
ble. . . or vituperous"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publish-
ing Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2607, 2612 (Okla.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982);
Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J. 1981); From v. Tallahassee
Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); R. SACK, supra note 13, at 179; 1
A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS § 141 (Supp. No. 3, 1976). But see Mashburn v.
Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977) (only opinion on public matters protected); Miskovsky
v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 103 S. Ct. 235, 235-36 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (federal law does not compel states to protect opinion).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
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ice" or fault can arise only from a false statement of fact." Thus, to
prove fault the plaintiff must show that the writing contains or implies
a statement of fact, and the falsity of that statement. 47
Although some commentators have criticized this approach as im-
practicable - an attempt to draw a line between "fact" and "opin-
ion" 148 -the question whether a writing contains or implies statements
of fact does not require the court, or trier of fact, to pigeonhole the
writing in one of these categories. The jury asks whether a writing con-
.tains statements of fact, 149 not whether it is a statement of fact or an
opinion. Thus, the inception of an absolute protection standard for
opinion, unlike one for "fiction,"' 50 is conceptually useful. The test is
not to identify a writing as an "opinion" and to declare its invulnerabil-
ity from defamation actions. The conclusory label "opinion" does not
afford talismatic immunity.' 5' For example, it is erroneous to state cat-
egorically that cartoons and editorials fall into a one category, and arti-
cles, as opinions and not fact, fall into another.
The proper test is whether the writing, reasonably read and in con-
text, tends to damage the plaintiff's reputation by an express or implied
statement of facts. 52 An "opinion" can be defamatory only insofar as
146. Eg, Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) ("An assertion that
cannot be proved false cannot be held libelous."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Cibenko
v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J. 1981).
147. Eg., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976) ("the
burden of proving falsity rests upon the plaintiff"); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co.,
7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2607, 2609 (Okla.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct 235 (1982); Wilson v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 374-76 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S.
962, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130 (1981).
148. Eg., Titus, Statement ofFact Versus Statement of Opinion - 4 Spurious Dispute in
Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962); Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First
Amendment. An Essay in Memory ofHarry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 276-81 (1978); see 1
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 458-59 (noting difficulty in distinguishing between
the two).
149. If the court determines that the writing is susceptible to an interpretation that it
contains or implies statements of fact, e.g., From v. Tallahasse Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d
52, 56 (Fla. App. 1981); Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J.
1981), the jury then decides whether the writing is actionable, e.g., Pease v. Telegraph Pub-
lishing Co., 121 N.H. 62,65, 426 A.2d 463,465 (1981); Good Government Group v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 682, 586 P.2d 572, 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
151. Eg., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. Eg., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1977); see Anderson, supra note 55, at 452 n. 150.
[T]he test to be applied in determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement [in a
writing] constitutes an actionable statement of fact requires that the court examine the
statement in its totality in the context in which it was. . . published. The court must
consider all words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the
court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement.
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it contains or reasonably implies the allegation of undisclosed defama-
tory facts as the basis for the opinion, 53 and if the defendant knew or
should have known the falsity of these facts.' 54 If the writing contains
the facts upon which it is based or the reader knows these facts (or has
them readily available to him), 5 5 an interpretation that the writing im-
plies a false statement of fact may be unreasonable.
Although the Supreme Court has not held expressly that opinions
are constitutionally protected, it has recognized that the reasonable
reader may understand certain words that usually are defamatory to be
"rhetorical hyperbole" - language that is nondefamatory because the
writing does not affect the recipient's perception of facts about the
plaintiff.56 For example, to call someone a "murderer" may be defam-
atory, but in the context of a restaurant review the reader probably
would understand the critic to be expressing an opinion about the
food.'57 In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler,158
the Court excused a newspaper that characterized a real estate devel-
oper's negotiating stance with a city council as "blackmail." Justice
Stewart stated that liability was constitutionally impermissible because
"even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was
no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those
who considered [the plaintiff's] negotiating position extremely unrea-
sonable."'5 9 The protection for rhetorical hyperbole is not limited to
the use of a single word: The reader may perceive a sentence, a para-
Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement,
including the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to
which it is published.
Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir.
1980).
153. Eg., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 555 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1977).
154. Eg., Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 531-33, 343 A.2d 251, 263-64 (1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
155. E.g., Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335, 338 (D.C. 1965) ("available" or
"readily accessible"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); see Christie, supra
note 139,passim; Note, 23 MD. L. REv. 76,passim (1963). But see A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby,
227 Md. 267, 282, 176 A.2d 340, 348 (1962) (pre-New York Times Case holding that facts
must be known or referred to, not merely accessible to the reader).
156. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); see also
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (rationale founded in federal labor policy, but
drawn from New York Times).
157. See, e.g., Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977) (restaurant review
complaining of "trout a la green plague").
158. 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (Stewart, J.).
159. Id. at 14. "It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word
'blackmail' in either article would not have understood exactly what was meant." Id.
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graph, or even an entire book as nondefamatory. 6 ° The reasonable
reader judges the "vigorous epithet" in context.
In addition, Gertz forces courts to examine the writer's level of
care in stating "opinions" if the writing appears to be defamatory. As
with the "of and concerning" requirement, 61 the fictionist has the best
of two worlds: A writing may be nondefamatory, but if the reader per-
ceives otherwise, the defendant nevertheless can prevail because of an
absence of fault in realizing that the reasonable reader would consider
the writing defamatory.' 62
2. Fiction's Influence on the Reader - Readers realize that fiction
may fail to make any false representations of fact. Assuming sufficient
statements of fact exist to satisfy the identification requirement, 63 the
allegedly defamatory portions of the writing may fail to represent the
plaintiff. For example, "[t]he invented action of a novel [may be] noth-
ing more than the author's opinion of what a character would do under
certain circumstances.' Thus, the character's inner thoughts, his in-
timate conversations, and his involvement in purely speculative events
may suggest how an actual person would act under similar conditions,
or his motivation in past events. Quotes of conversations, physical de-
scriptions, and other indicia attributed to the defendant, even if "false,"
do not necessarily provide the requisite falsity to show "actual malice"
or fault; some fictionalization is permissible.
65
160. See, e.g., University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
22 A.D.2d 452, 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (movie), a fd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508
(1965) (movie); Werber v. Klopfer, 260 Md. 486, 496, 272 A.2d 631, 637 (1971) (pamphlet).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
162. See, e.g., Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d
672, 682, 586 P.2d 572, 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
164. Silver, supra note 9, at 1069 (emphasis added); accord Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (1979). "It is clear that, on principles enunciated in
Sullivan and elucidated in its progeny, creative works of fiction (and speculative works of
scholarship) could be protected when clearly understood as such. In essence, psychological
character probing is an educated guess about human motivation - an opinion." Silver,
supra note 9, at 1069.
165. Eg., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1977); Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969). In Hotchner, the defendant contended that
Doubleday should be liable simply because it knowlingly published a bowdlerized ver-
sion of Hemingway's alleged statement [about the plaintiff]. . . . It is true that in
transforming Hemingway's words to the much milder 'I don't trust him,' Doubleday
was fictionalizing to some extent. However, the change did not increase the defamatory
impact or, alter the substantive content of Hemingway's statement about Hotchner. If
Doubleday could not have been liable for publishing the uncut version, it cannot be
liable for deciding to make the passage less offensive to Hotchner.
1d. at 914. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (1977) ("It is not
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The characterization of a real person as a saint or as a prostitute
(either in a similie or actually portrayed as such a person) may further
the reader's understanding of the fictionist's appraisal of the real per-
son. For example, Richard Nixon did not participate in the Watergate
burglary, but some cartoons at the time placed him in burglar's garb
inside the Democratic headquarters. This characterization is another
form of "rhetorical hyperbole."
Similarly, the blatant use of pervasively known persons as literary
characters may be protected notwithstanding apparent satisfaction of
the "of and concerning" requirement and a derogatory description of
the literary double. The reasonable reader realizes that the reference to
well-known figures is a common literary device and modifies his recog-
nition of the character accordingly. 166 For example, using the name
"Ronald Reagan," is artistically more expedient and effective than cre-
ating a "President of the United States" totally dissimilar from any real
president. The technique is defensible on two grounds: First, the
reader nevertheless may understand that the fiction does not identify
the actual person.' 67 Second, the reader, in the alternative, may con-
clude that although the writing identifies the plaintiff, the allegedly de-
famatory portion does not factually represent him.
An argument that the fictionist is portraying the mythological
character embodied in the plaintiffs name, not the plaintiff himself,
can preclude the defamation of this limited class of plaintiffs. If a per-
vasively known person's public persona has "a life of its own," the
reader may interpret the presence of these archetypal characters as ex-
ploiting and expanding the mythological connotations the name sug-
gests, and feel free to disregard the apparent representation of the real
person. For example, a fanciful spy novel set in the Vietnam era could
contain "Lyndon Johnson" or "Richard Nixon" as characters and nev-
ertheless forbid an understanding that the writing factually represented
these presidents falsely.
Courts generally have been tolerant of the fictitious treatment of
real persons who have captured the public's attention, even if only for a
moment. 6  Throughout history many people, places, and events have
necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of
expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance."). Mc-
Bee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 426 (1878) ("substantial truth" doctine).
166. See, e.g., University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
22 A.D.2d 452, 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304-05 (well-known college), afrd, 15 N.Y.2d 940,
207 N.E.2d 508 (1965).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 16-100 & 115-36.
168. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) (murder vic-
tim's widow and daughter); Cohen v. New York Herald, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d
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become part of our mythology, and in an age of pervasive media the
list is expanding rapidly. 16 9 Even private persons who fleetingly, and
often unwittingly, impress themselves into our collective consciousness
become recognizable archetypal characters - the victims of a tragic
murder and their families, a police officer who investigated a famous
crime, or a child genius. 7 ° These lesser known public personae, how-
ever, later may recede into obscurity once public recognition has
waned. 17'
III. BINDPIM AND PRING: LIABILITY WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
Bindrim v. Mitchell and Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., two
cases which have attracted fictionists' attention, are dangerous touch-
stones for a court confronting an allegedly defamatory work of fiction.
These opinions demonstrate the traps awaiting courts that mechanical-
ly apply common-law and constitutional defamation principles. Re-
gardless of whether the publications involved in these cases are
defamatory, the Bindrim and Pring courts failed to understand how a
reasonable reader perceives fiction.
A. Bindrim v. Mitchell: 172 An "Vnaccurate Portrayal"
Bindrim held a novelist and her publisher liable for a breed of
709 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (witness to gangland murder); Polakoff v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (gangster's lawyer), af'dmemr, 67 A.D.2d
871, 413 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1978). But see American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962) (guard from whom Al Capone escaped portrayed in
an episode of The Untouchables).
169. Consider "Frank Sinatra" in M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER (1969); "Howard Hughes"
in Diamonds are Forever (1971); "Judy Garland" in Valley of the Dolls (1968).
170. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (no
liability for fictionalization of tragic murder); Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d
250 (1970) (same); Waters v. Moore, 70 Misc. 2d 372, 376, 334 N.Y.S.2d 428, 433 (Sup. Ct.
1972) (police officer in The French Connection); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806
(2d Cir.) (child prodigy), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); see also Polakoff v. Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2516 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.) (Lucky Luciano's
lawyer), affdmem., 67 A.D.2d 871, 413 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1978); Bilney v. Evening Star, 43 Md.
App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (1979)(state university basketball players).
171. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (former child prodigy),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); cf. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn. Inc., 443 U.S. 157,
165-68 (1979) (suspected spy who "led a thoroughly private existence prior to the grand jury
inquiry [in 1957 and 19581 and returned to a position of relative obscurity after his sentenc-
ing" not a public figure in 1974).
172. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Kingsley, J.)(2-1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980). Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
dissented from the denial of certiorari. 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
Some commentators have condemned Bindrim, but to date no article has thoroughly
analyzed the court's logic. See, e.g., Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird Freedom of Expression
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
falsehood that the Supreme Court never envisioned when it imposed
constitutional law in the area of defamation. A California District
Court of Appeal transformed the first amendment into a device that
renders all fiction defamatory because of its inherent falsity.
If courts follow Bindrim ,173 fictionists will be unable to present
fictional accounts of real life phenomena. Gwen Davis Mitchell's
novel, Touching, 7 4 sought to expose the failings of a brand of group
therapy which she thought dishonest: the "Nude Marathon" in which
people "shed their psychological inhibitions with the removal of their
clothes."' 75 In preparation for writing her novel, Mitchell attended
Nude Marathon sessions offered by the plaintiff, Dr. Paul Bindrim. Al-
though the author undeniably drew from this experience in writing
Touching, she did not seek to portray Bindrim, but created as her main
character a "Dr. Simon Herford," a doctor radically different from
Bindrim.
Instead of first determining whether the writing was of and con-
cerning Bindrim, and then considering whether it contained un-
privileged false statements of fact about him, the court perversely
infused constitutional law into the "of and concerning" calculus, and
decided that Mitchell had acted with "actual malice" toward the plain-
tiff before finding that the novel identified the plaintiff.'76 The majority
reasoned that a fictionist knows the "falsity" of his fiction, and used
New York Times to cast out all identifying indicia that were "false,"' 7 7
leaving the literary character naked except for the characteristics that
he shared with the plaintiff. Thus, characteristics that under common
law belied the plaintiffs contention that the writing referred to him and
supported a reasonable inference that the character was fictional be-
came the requisite intentional false statements of fact needed to over-
come the defendant's constitutional privilege. The reasonable reader
does not ignore the suspect character's defamatory characteristics.
No reader who knew Bindrim - the perspective from which the
writing must be analyzed' 78 - reasonably could have attributed the
in the Eighties, 14 Loy. L.A.L Rev. 57, 69-71 (1980); Goodale, Stranger Than Fiction: The
Novel That Gave Rise to Libel Damages, Nat'l L.J., May 5, 1980 at 26; Pilpel & Chasen, The
Trouble With "Faction", Publishers Weekly July 18, 1980, at 20.
173. One court incorrectly stated that "Bindrim is the only decision in which a court ap-
plies the clear and convincing proof of actual malice requirement to a work of fiction [and
therefore] is the only bench mark for this court." Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (D.N.J. 1981).
174. G. DAVIS, TOUCHING (1971).
175. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
176. Id. at 71-76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-38.
177. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
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character's behavior to the plaintiff. The dissimilarities between Bin-
drim and his literary counterpart should have precluded identification
of Herford as the plaintiff. The differences were overwhelming: Bin-
drim, a thin, clean-shaven licensed clinical psychologist, was trans-
formed in Touching into the unstable, even violent, Simon Herford, a
psychistrist who was a "fat Santa Claus type with long white hair, white
sideburns, a cherubic rosy face and rosy forearms."' 17 9 Herford's ses-
sions bore little resemblance to those Mitchell had attended. The simi-
larities between the two were superficial: Both (1) were male,
(2) offered Nude Marathon group therapy (as did at least ten others in
California at that time), and (3) shared a few speech mannerisms.'
Bindrim did not claim that the defendant had described him, but in-
stead argued that he was "libeled by the suggestion that he used ob-
scene language which he did not in fact use.. [and] various other
libels due to Mitchell's inaccurate portrayal ... 81
In lieu of parallels between Bindrim and his literary counterpart,
the majority relied upon "a close parallel between the narrative of the
plaintiff's novel and the actual real life events,"'18 2 and failed to realize
that those readers who could recognize the parallel would not identify
179. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37. Bindrim "was clean shaven and had
short hair," and did not act like Herford. Id.
In Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962), a case also
involving severe distortions of the plaintiff, the court affirmed a summary judgment for the
defendant on the identification requirement by reasoning:
[Any reasonable person who read the book and was in a position to identify
[the plaintiff] with [the literary character] would more likely conclude that the author
created the latter in an ugly way so that none would identify her with [the plaintiffl. It
is important to note that while the [events] and locale might suggest [the plaintiff] to
those who knew [her] family, suggestion is not identification.
Id. at 376.
180. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44. Compare Bindrim with Springer v.
Viking Press, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2040 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (overwhelming similarities).
In Springer, the trial judge noted,
Plaintiff points not only to certain similar physical features between plaintiff and [the
literary character], but also describes other apparently unique characteristics to wit:
both lived on 114th Street in Manhattan; both received gifts of a solitary diamond and a
necklace from a boyfriend; both spoke fluent French and dated men of Iranian heritage.
Id. at 2041.
181. Id. at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35. Compare Bindrim with Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.,
300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (poor imitation of Bert Lahr's voice in radio ad not actiona-
ble), and Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (inaccurate
portrayal bars identification).
182. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38. One reason that these parallels may have
overwhelmed the court is shown in the original text of the Bindrim opinion (before orders of
modification): "[Tihe court [incorrectly] believed [that the defendant] possessed actual tran-
scripts of the encounter session she had attended and that she had intended to 'report' the
facts therein as if she were writing a news account." Petition of Doubleday & Company,
Inc. for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California, at 19-20, Bin-
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Herford as portraying Bindrim.'83 The cavalcade of evidence that
showed that the defendant used the encounter sessions as the basis for
her novel - a contract (invalid under California law) in which she
promised not to write about the sessions,' 84 tape recordings of actual
sessions which were compared to passages of Touching,'85 testimony by
the plaintiff and his colleagues,'8 6 and even Mitchell's own admis-
sions'87 - yielded parallels of a brand that exist in every work of
fiction. These parallels between the real and imaginary worlds, how-
ever, cannot satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement.' 8
In addition to ignoring dissimilarities between Bindrim and
Herford and relying on basis-in-fact, the court failed to distinguish
properly between two elements of defamation: the "of and concern-
ing" and false statement of fact requirements.' 89 It upheld the jury's
conclusion that the novel was a factual statement, not an opinion,
about Bindrim or his therapy "since there was evidence that people had
identified plaintiff with the 'Dr. Herford' of the book . ,.19o A writ-
ing, however, can be a constitutionally protected expression of opinion
despite satisfaction of the "of and concerning" requirement.
The dissenter on the three-judge panel predicted a "chilling effect
upon the publisher of any novel critical of any occupational practice,
inviting litigation on the theory 'when you criticize my occupation, you
libel me.' "'91 He relied on group defamation analysis 192 and a "right"
drim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979),
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari].
183. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
184. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33, 41.
185. Id. at 70-71, 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 37. The opinion quotes an actual session and a
passage of the novel side-by-side. Id. at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
186. /d. at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The defendant raised a question whether the "publi-
cation" requirement was satisfied, see id. at 79, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39, but failed to challenge
the judgment on the grounds that these "certain colleagues" may have been given the book
by Bindrim himself. See supra note 37.
187. Id. at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
The court attempted to distinguish Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372
(7th Cir. 1962), and Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969),
cases in which the "of and concerning" requirement was not satisfied, by downplaying the
differences between the plaintiff and Herford and relying on basis-in-fact. See 92 Cal. App.
3d at 75-76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. The court ignored language in Wheeler and Mid-
dlebrooks that basis is not relevant to the issue of identification. See Wheeler, 300 F.2d at
376; Middlebrooks, 413 F.2d at 143.
189. See 92 Cal. App. 3d at 76-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. The court applied the "of and
concerning" test from Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir.
1969), to determine if the writing expressed an opinion about the plaintiff. See 92 Cal. App.
3d. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
190. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
191. Id. at 89, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Files, P.J., dissenting).
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to criticize a profession, and challenged the majority's logic in disre-
garding the "falsity" in Touching.
93
The California District Court of Appeal transformed the shield of
New York Times into a sword for the plaintiff. The Bindrim opinion
thus fulfilled Professor Kalven's dire prophecy made shortly after New
York Times:
There is revealed here a new technique by which defamation
might be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, contrary
to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff, then that it
falsely ascribed to the plaintiff something that he did not do, which
should be rather easy to prove about a statement that did not refer
to the plaintiff in the first place. 94
Having committed this fatal mistake, the court could only accept the
plaintiff's case.
B. Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd: 95 A One-in-Ffty Chance
In Pring, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court
judgment against author Phillip Cioffari and his publisher, Penthouse
magazine, for a bawdy parody of the Miss America pageant and its
contestants. A two-to-one majority held that the story was too fanciful
to be reasonably understood as a statement of fact. But in sparing the
defendants from liability, the court incorrectly analyzed the "of and
concerning" issue, and broadly framed its holding to enable a mis-
chievous fictionist to escape liability for defamation merely by present-
ing impossible feats in bizarre settings.
192. See, e.g., Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 185, 197-98 (N.Y. 1840) (group of malting
establishments). Justice Jefferson wrote a concurrence especially to refute the dissenter's
group defamation analysis. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 82-84, 155 Cal. Rptr. 41-42.
193. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 84-89, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 42-45. See Petition for Certiorari, supra
note 182, at 19-25.
194. Kalven, supra note 82, at 199 (analyzing argument of plaintiff in New York Times).
Kalven noted that "the Court did not have to confront this logic," but that the argument
"remains temporarily buried for resurrection at some later time." Id.
195. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), reversing No. C79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981). The
plaintiff has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1983)
(No. 82-1621). See also Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101 (D.
Wyo. 1981) (denial of Penthouse's motion for summary judgment); Miss America Pageant,
Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981) (same story).
The portion of the district court's denial of Penthouse's motion for summary
judgment on the "of and concerning" issue merely quoted comment d of section 564 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and stated that the "of and concerning" requirement is a
question for the jury. 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1104.
The trial court entered a judgment for $14 million against Penthouse and one for
$35,000 against Cioffari. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants, at 7, Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
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In August, 1979, Cioffari and Penthouse19 6 published Miss Wyo-
ming Saves the World ... But She Blew the Contest With Her Tal-
ent,'9 7 which the Tenth Circuit labeled "a gross, unpleasant, crude,
distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss America contest and contestants
... [with] no redeeming features whatever."'' 98 The story chronicled
the rise of a "Miss Wyoming" named "Charlene" who had performed
or was willing to perform fellatio upon anyone, from the local high
school football star to the entire Soviet Central Committee. Kimerli
Jayne Pring, the reigning Miss Wyoming and the natural brunt of
many jokes from this bawdy story,' 99 sued, alleging that the story "cre-
ate[d] the impression" that she performed fellatio upon "one Monty
Applewhite" (the imaginary football star), her pageant coach, and her
twirling baton both on and off national television.2 °°
Although the defendants escaped liability because of the fantastic
nature of the tale, the Tenth Circuit disregarded the "of and concern-
ing" element by simply distinguishing it from the statement of fact re-
quirement, and holding that the record supported the jury's finding.2 ° '
But Cioffari did not portray Pring. Instead, he used a permissible liter-
ary device: the American beauty queen, an archetypal character.20 2
The appellation "Miss Wyoming" is insufficient in itself to identify
any one person who holds or has held this title. Even if the story had
purported to be factual, additional indicia are required.20 3 Regardless
196. In Wyoming, libel defendants are subject to criminal sanctions:
Whoever makes, composes, dictates, prints or writes a libel to be published; or procures
the same to be done; and whoever publishes or knowingly aids in publishing or commu-
nicating a libel, is guilty of libel, and shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000.00), to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
three (3) months.
Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-204 (1977); see also Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-205 (1977) (slander).
Although the last reported case of criminal libel in Wyoming was in 1928, see State
v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24 (1927), reh'g denied, 263 P. 623 (1928), and the constitu-
tionality of criminal libel has been challenged, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 69-
70 (1964) (requiring "actual malice"); see Spencer, Criminal Libel -. 4 Skeleton in the Cup-
board, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 383, 465, the Wyoming statute is an effective chill on free speech.
197. Cioffari, Miss Wyoming Saves the World... But She Blew the Contest With Her
Talent, Penthouse, August, 1979, at 155.
198. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982),petitionfor cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1983) (No. 82-1621).
199. Emotional distress is not compensable unless the writing invades the plaintiff's le-
gally protected interest in her reputation. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
200. Id. at 441.
201. Id. at 439. Chief Judge Seth correctly noted that the "of and concerning" element
and the false statement of fact requirement are distinct, see id. at 440, but may have failed to
realize that a lack of factual assertions contributes to an understanding that a writing is
fiction and identifies no real person. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
203. An assertion that "a Miss Wyoming has performed fellatio on her pageant coach"
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of whether the plaintiff herself was a public or private figure, 2" "Miss
Wyoming" has an identity all her own. The plaintiff and others who
have held this and similar titles have contributed to the image that the
name invokes.20 5 Archetypal titles, such as "mayor of Snow Hill,"2 °6
"Sheriff in Malone," 20 7 or "Miss Wyoming," cannot identify a person
temporarily holding the title without additional specific identification.
Additionally, the story, which named thirteen other state contestants,20 8
gave the reader no reason to assume that Wyoming was not an arbi-
trary choice out of the fifty contestants. In parodying a beauty contest
as well known as the Miss America pageant, a fictionist need not create
an imaginary contest with fabricated titles. This subterfuge would fail
on a literary level, and is unnecessary to satisfy standards imposed by
the majority of courts that have encountered defamation problems in
fiction that depicts contemporary events.2°
Pring presented scant evidence that she was the "Miss Wyoming"
depicted in the story, or that her title was anything other than an arbi-
trary choice. Both she and the literary Miss Wyoming wore articles of
blue clothing (albeit different ones) and twirled batons (as did other
contestants). 210 All of "Miss Wyoming's" other attributes, such as the
names of her high school and friends, were different from those in the
plaintiff's past. Neither did the story state the year of "Miss Wyo-
ming's" reign. The performance of incredible, and impossible, feats -
would not be actionable by itself under either standard or group identification analysis. See
infra note 206 and accompanying text.
204. The trial court opinion on the denial of summary judgment, see supra note 195, and
a large portion of the defendant's and the two amici curiae's briefs, see Brief of the Authors
League of America, Inc., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), and
Brief of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, id., were devoted to this issue.
Whether Kimerli Jayne Pring was a "public figure" is beyond the scope of this Comment.
But the group of Miss America contestants may have included some "public figures." See
Pring, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101, 1103 (D. Wyo. 1981) (winners of major beauty pag-
eants might be public figures). If so, Rosenblatt may require that she be "specifically identi-
fied" beyond the mere use of her title. See supra text accompanying notes 80-101.
205. See supra text accompanying note 133-34.
206. See Barnes v. State, 88 Md. 347, 353, 41 A. 781, 783-84 (1898) (county newspaper
article did not identify local mayor absent name, year of office, or any other indicia). See
supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
207. See Lyons v. New American Library, 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1980) (fic-
tional "Sheriff in Malone").
208. "Miss Alaska," "Miss Montana," "Miss Idaho," "'Miss New Jersey," "Miss New
York," "Miss Florida," and "Miss Tennessee" also behaved improperly in the story. Six
other contestants who were named appear to have behaved themselves. See Cioffari, supra
note 199,passim.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 111-38 & 170-73.
210. See Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants, at 9, Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
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a point that the court emphasized in finding no statement of fact about
the plaintiff - contributed to a reasonable perception that the story
was a fictional, not a factual, representation of the Miss America pag-
eant and one of its contestants. 21' The reasonable reader could not
conclude that notwithstanding the story's appearance as fiction the
writing portrayed the plaintiff.
Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding that the story was
of and concerning Pring, it held as a matter of law that "it is simply
impossible to believe that a reader would not have understood that the
[allegations of fellatio] were pure fantasy and nothing else. 21 2 The
standard set forth by Chief Judge Seth - that the story must reason-
ably be understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or her
actual conduct - is entirely correct, but the majority's discussion of
this standard suggests that a fictionist might escape liability merely by
placing his defamation in an impossible setting. As the reasonable
reader may perceive apparent "statements" to be rhetorical hyperbole,
exaggerative language similarly can be understood as a factual asser-
tion. A writing need not be taken "literally," as Seth r~quires, 21 3 be-
cause the reasonable reader nonetheless may cut through the superflous
verbiage and discover a defamatory statement of fact. For example,
the detail that Charlene's partners levitated should not in itself bar lia-
bility. Although defiance of gravity may be impossible, the reasonable
reader occasionally may disregard flamboyant details in fiction.
Despite these broad generalizations, Chief Judge Seth was correct
in holding that this story was a complete fantasy and that the reason-
able reader would not understand it to make any statement of fact.
Although Judge Breitenstein, in dissent, properly stated that
"[rjesponsibility for an irresponsible and reckless statement of fact, fel-
latio, may not be avoided by the gratuitous addition of fantasy, ' 214 Ci-
offari's story is fiction, not fact embellished by fiction. The fantasy in
Miss Wyoming Saves the World was not "gratuitous," but compelled an
understanding that the tale did not portray real people and events.
By ignoring the "of and concerning" requirement, Pring allows a
plaintiff who has been in the limelight, even if only for a moment, to
profit from fiction that depicts similar characters. Had Cioffari been
mundane in his description of the pageant and its contestants he might
not have escaped liability under the Tenth Circuit's opinion. Fiction-
211. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
212. 695 F.2d at 443.
213. Id. at 442. Judge Seth relied primarily upon Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n., Inc. v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
214. 695 F.2d at 444.
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ists who rely on "presidents," "Miss Wyomings," and other common
archetypal characters should not have to fear defamation suits.
CONCLUSION
Defamation law is no stranger to fiction. Fiction does not require
special privileges and protections, 2 s but an awareness of how the rea-
sonable reader's perception of a writing as fiction affects every element
and defense in defamation law. Primarily, the "inaccurate portrayal"
of a real person may not satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement.
Unlike writings that purport to be factual, suspect characters in fiction
rarely portray real people. The process of identification requires more
than correctly guessing upon whom the fiction is based or to whom the
writing is otherwise related. Second, if a character is identified as the
plaintiff, the writing nevertheless may be nondefamatory as failing to
make a false representation of fact about the plaintiff or as a constitu-
tionally protected expression of opinion. A sensitive application of
these principles will protect both interests at stake: the fictionist's need
for free speech and a remedy for the individual's injured reputation.
215. Some commentators have been unable to find sufficient protection for fiction in the
common and constitutional law of defamation, and have proposed a myriad of special privi-
leges and protections. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 107, at 38-39, 43-49 (absolute protection
standard); Comment, supra note 41,passim (same); Comment, supra note 9, at 944 (rebutta-
ble presumption). Part of their dissatisfaction may result from misunderstanding current
defamation law. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 107, at 27 (New York Times and Gertz "offer
no first amendment protection to. . . literary works classified as fiction"); Comment, supra
note 41, at 592 ("the impossible task of applying the elements of defamation to fiction").
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